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1  Introduction 
Motivated by the observation that many important economic decisions are made by teams 
rather than individuals, experimental economics has recently witnessed a surge of interest in 
team decision making. Extending the existing psychology literature to domains of specific 
interest  to  economists,  researchers  have  established  that  team  choices  are  generally  more 
rational (e.g. Cooper and Kagel, 2005; Blinder and Morgan, 2005; Kocher and Sutter, 2005; 
Charness and Jackson, 2007) and more self-interested than individuals (e.g. Bornstein and 
Yaniv, 1998; Luhan, Kocher, and Sutter, 2009). These studies have focused on comparing 
teams with individuals and have generally not emphasized the internal organization of teams. 
A universal feature of existing studies is that team members are all engaged in the same task. 
While appropriate for establishing basic observations about how teams perform relative to 
individuals, use of homogenous tasks departs significantly from the reality of many team 
environments. Team members in most environments are filling different roles and completing 
different tasks. Not all team members are equally well suited for all tasks, so getting the right 
person assigned to the right task can be an important determinant of team success. In this 
paper  we  examine  role  assignment  and  team  performance  in  a  team  task  where  one  role 
requires considerably more strategic thought than the other, making proper role assignment 
crucial for the success of a team. 
It is by no means trivial to correctly assign people to tasks, both because it may not be 
obvious who is best suited for each task and because team members may desire tasks for 
which they are poorly suited. Professional sports provide many good examples of this. For 
instance, typically different people are in charge of signing players for a team (the general 
manager or GM) and coaching the team. Both jobs are critical for the success of the team and 
there isn’t an obvious hierarchical relationship between the two jobs.
1 Many coaches want to 
control the teams’ personnel decisions, either by formally taking on the title of GM or by 
performing the GM’s duties while having a subordinate hold the title. This can harm the 
team’s performance since the skills that make a good coach aren’t the same as the skills that 
make a good GM. For example, Mike Holmgren was a successful coach in American football, 
leading Green Bay to a championship by winning the Super Bowl following the 1996 season. 
Holmgren left Green Bay in 1999 to take over in Seattle as both coach and GM. This was 
unsuccessful and Holmgren was fired as the GM (but not as coach) in 2002. Acting solely as a 
coach, Holmgren led Seattle to the Super Bowl following the 2005 season. Team success 
                                                 
1 In most teams, the GM is theoretically the coach’s boss with the right to hire and fire. In practice the positions 
are fairly equal with decisions on hiring and firing for both jobs made higher in the organizational hierarchy by a 
team owner or president.   2
relied on Holmgren being placed in the role he was best suited for, but it took failure and 
direct intervention by the team’s upper management to get him assigned to the correct role.
  
Turning to a field that is less glamorous (but probably more important economically) 
than professional sports, software development provides an interesting mixture of different 
ways that tasks might be assigned. Large software projects usually require a development 
team. The traditional way of running a software development team is to have an externally 
assigned project manager. Team members do not choose their tasks, but are instead assigned 
tasks by the project manager. Over the past decade, software development has moved towards 
“agile  software  development”,  a  broad  category  that  encompasses  a  number  of  specific 
software design approaches such as Scrum, Extreme Programming, and Crystal Clear. The 
shift  toward  agile  software  development  involved  many  changes  in  the  design  process, 
including a move toward teams that are self-managed. As an example consider Scrum, one of 
the  most  popular  variants  of  agile  software  development.  Teams  using  Scrum  meet  on  a 
regular basis to set short-term goals. No specific team member is designated as the team 
leader. Tasks are assigned via discussion among the team members, with the idea that team 
members  know  more  about  each  other  and  the  tasks  to  be  performed  than  any  outside 
individual.  
Even in a field like software development that offers a broad variety of methods for 
assigning individuals to tasks, using field data to study the relative effectiveness of methods is 
problematic.
2  Agile  software  development  involves  a  multitude  of  changes  to  traditional 
methods  of  software  development,  and  any  two  implementations  differ  on  multiple 
dimensions. Even if there existed sufficient variation that the effect of different elements of 
the process could be identified via multivariate regressions, there would remain the problem 
of endogeneity. It is not random what software development process is adopted by a particular 
firm and no obvious instrument exists for the process adoption decision. 
We  therefore  turn  to  laboratory  experiments  to  study  the  role  of  task  assignment  in 
determining  team  effectiveness.  Using  lab  experiments  lets  us  choose  a  task  where  role 
assignment is critical. In a lab experiment we can control crucial elements of the environment 
such  as  incentives,  information  available  to  team  members,  and  (most  importantly)  the 
process by which roles are assigned, and makes it possible to observe all the interactions 
among team mates. The latter point is important since we want to understand the process that 
leads to certain rules for task assignment being more effective.  
                                                 
2 See Chow and Cao (2008) for a study of the effectiveness of agile software development.   3
Going into the details of the experimental design, subjects play a simplified version of 
the takeover game (Samuelson and Bazerman, 1985). The takeover game is played by two 
individuals, a Buyer and a Seller. The Seller has a single item to sell. She knows the value of 
this item while the Buyer only knows the distribution of values. The value of the item to the 
Buyer is always 150% of the value to the Seller. The Buyer submits a bid to buy the item. If 
the Seller accepts the bid, the Seller’s payoff is the difference between the bid and her value 
while the Buyer’s payoff is the difference between his value and his bid. If the Seller rejects 
the  bid,  both  the  Buyer  and  Seller  get  a  payoff  of  zero.  The  Seller’s  payoff  maximizing 
strategy is trivial: she should accept any bid greater than her value. Because of the asymmetric 
information between Buyers and Sellers, the Buyer faces adverse selection. In choosing a bid 
he needs to understand that the expected value of the item conditional on having his bid 
accepted is less than the expected value ex ante. The adverse selection is sufficiently severe 
that submitting a bid equal to the lowest possible value is the Buyer’s payoff maximizing 
strategy.  
Previous  work  on  the  takeover  game  has  focused  on  why  the  winner’s  curse  (over-
bidding) occurs, but our intent is to use the takeover game to understand how task assignment 
affects  team  performance.  For  our  purposes,  two  features  of  the  takeover  game  are 
particularly valuable. First, the Buyer and Seller roles differ greatly in difficulty. The Seller’s 
optimal strategy is trivial, but previous work (e.g., Grosskopf, Bereby-Meyer and Bazerman, 
2007; Bereby-Meyer and Grosskopf, 2008; Charness and Levin, 2009) has established that 
Buyers have a great deal of difficulty understanding that they need to bid low due to adverse 
selection. Buyers consistently overbid even when the problem is highly simplified and played 
repeatedly.  Second,  play  by  freely  interacting  teams  reduces  but  does  not  eliminate 
overbidding in the takeover game (Casari, Zhang, and Jackson, 2010). This allows us to study 
the  relationship  between  the  importance  of  role  selection  and  the  degree  of  interaction 
between teammates.
3 
In  the  initial  phase  of  the  experiment,  all  subjects  play  as  Buyers  facing  a  series  of 
computerized Sellers. In control sessions the Buyers continue to play against computerized 
Sellers  for  the  second  phase  of  the  experiment.  For  the  other  four  treatments  in  our 
experimental design, subjects are matched into teams of two players each. One teammate 
plays exclusively as a Buyer and the other plays exclusively as a Seller. Each plays a series of 
takeover games against Buyers and Sellers from other teams and split their earnings evenly. 
                                                 
3 In Casari et al. (2010) groups consist of three members who are all in the role of buyers (while sellers were 
computerized). Unlike the work we present below, their paper does not focus on role selection and how it affects 
team performance.   4
Teammates never play against each other, so their interests are perfectly aligned. The four 
treatments with teams systematically vary along two dimensions: (1) the Buyer and Seller 
roles are either assigned randomly and exogenously or are endogenously agreed upon by the 
two teammates, and (2) teammates either play independently, only interacting through their 
shared payoffs, or are given periodic opportunities to chat about how to play the game. Ex 
ante, we expect either endogenous role selection or chat between teammates to improve the 
Buyers’  performance  by  lowering  bids.
4  When  the  two  are  combined,  with  teammates 
discussing  both  what  roles  to  take  and  how  to  play  the  game,  we  hypothesize  that  their 
performance  will  improve  more  (bids  will  be  lower)  than  with  chat  or  endogenous  role 
assignment alone since teams can get the more able individual assigned to the Buyer role as 
well as taking advantage of insights from the teammate assigned to the Seller role.
5 
We  find  that  chat  with  random  role  assignment  leads  to  significantly  lower  bids 
compared to the baseline treatment of random role assignment and no interactions between 
teammates. Endogenous role assignment without chat also causes a significant reduction in 
bids compared to the baseline. To our surprise, bids are higher with chat and endogenous role 
assignment  than  with  either  chat  or  endogenous  role  assignment  alone  and  are  no  longer 
significantly  lower  than  in  the  baseline.  The  combination  of  chat  and  endogenous  role 
assignment harms performance rather than improving it. 
Underlying  our  hypotheses  about  treatment  effects  were  a  pair  of  behavioral 
assumptions: (1) chat between teammates improves a Buyer’s performance controlling for 
ability and (2) endogenous role assignment will improve the sorting of high ability individuals 
into the Buyer role. In the treatment with chat and endogenous role assignment, neither of 
these assumptions is supported by the data. Controlling for Buyer ability, chat significantly 
reduces bids when role assignment is random but has virtually no effect when role assignment 
is endogenous. The differing effects of chat are driven by differences in the dialogues between 
teammates;  teams  are  significantly  less  likely  to  discuss  either  bidding  or  the  benefits  of 
bidding  low  when  there  is  endogenous  role  assignment  and  chat  rather  than  chat  only. 
Combining chat and endogenous role assignment also harms the ability of teams to assign the 
right person to the right role. The process for selecting roles should favor individuals who bid 
low in the initial stage for the role of Buyer. Buyers indeed bid significantly less than their 
                                                 
4 The Seller’s role is sufficiently trivial that we expected subjects to get it right regardless of treatment. The data 
supports this expectation. 
5 If teammates were able to perfectly communicate their insights about playing as a Buyer, it wouldn’t matter 
which individual became the Buyer. However, our data analysis finds that bids in the second phase are lower if 
the teammate who bid lower in the first phase is selected as Buyer. This effect is lessened but not eliminated 
when teammates can chat. Not all teammates are willing or able to share their insights, so it matters which 
teammate becomes the Buyer.   5
teammates assigned to the Seller role when there is only endogenous role assignment, but not 
when endogenous role assignment is combined with chat. This failure to consistently get the 
right  person  in  the  right  role  stems  from  the  low  quality  of  the  underlying  discussions. 
Teammates often fail to agree on role assignments, or don’t abide by the agreements they 
have reached. They never cite performance in the initial phase as a justification for which 
teammate ought to be the Buyer. Allowing teams to discuss how to bid and who should take 
which role harms the performance of teams on both tasks. 
We conjecture that the poor quality of discussion by teams with chat and endogenous 
role selection is due to the high demands this treatment makes on subjects’ limited cognitive 
resources.  Teammates  do  not  face  a  significant  time  constraint  when  choosing  roles  and 
discussing  how  to  bid,  but  have  two  separate  tasks  that  require  attention.  Numerous 
psychology studies on ego depletion (e.g. Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice, 1998; 
Schmeichel, Vohs, and Baumeister, 2003) find that the strain multi-tasking places on subjects’ 
cognitive budgets reduces performance on intellective tasks like choosing the best person for 
a role or understanding the benefits of bidding low. 
Our results suggest some counter-intuitive advice for the assignment of tasks in teams. It 
is common wisdom that more employee involvement is better and that top-down management 
is counter-productive. While there is certainly some truth to these assertions (see Ichniowski 
and  Shaw,  1999),  traditional  top-down  management  may  not  be  entirely  bad.  When 
employees actively participate in choosing their roles, this increases the number of tasks that 
they need to perform. If there is interference between tasks, even when time constraints are 
not binding, exogenously assigning roles may free up employees’ attention to focus on more 
critical tasks. 
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 introduce the takeover game and the 
experimental design respectively. Section 4 develops initial hypotheses about likely treatment 
effects. Section 5 provides the results of the experiments, including analysis of the content of 
dialogues between teammates. Section 6 discusses the results. 
 
 
2  The Takeover Game 
Subjects  in  our  experiment  played  a  simplified  version  of  the  takeover  game.  This  game 
involves two individuals, a Buyer and a Seller. The game begins with the Seller drawing a 
value, V, for an indivisible item. This is the amount the item is worth to her. The possible 
values are 90, 600, and 1200 experimental points, with each value equally likely to be drawn.   6
The Seller knows the value of the item while the Buyer only knows the distribution of values. 
The Buyer submits a bid, B, to purchase the item, where bids are restricted to the set of 
integers between 0 and 2000 (inclusive). The Seller observes the bid and chooses to either 
accept or reject it. If the bid is accepted, the Buyer’s profit is 1.5*V – B and the Seller’s profit 
is B – V. If the bid is rejected, both players’ profits are zero. 
The Seller’s optimal strategy is simple – she should accept a bid if it is (weakly) greater 
than the value and reject otherwise. The Buyer’s optimal bid is less obvious. If the Seller is 
behaving  optimally,  the  Buyer’s  expected  payoff  maximizing  bid  is  90.  This  is  also  the 
optimal bid for a risk averse buyer. In evaluating the profitability of a bid, the Buyer has to 
consider the expected value of the item subject to the bid being accepted. In other words, the 
Buyer must account for adverse selection. Table 1 illustrates the basic features of the Buyer’s 
problem. A bid of 1200 induces all Sellers to accept the bid, including those with low (V = 
90) and medium (V = 600) values. Because the expected value of an item is only 630 points, 
even after a 50% mark-up it isn’t worth enough to make the bid profitable. The expected loss 
is large, 255 points, and Buyers lose money for two thirds of their bids. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
A naïve reaction to the severe losses at a high bid is to bid something in the middle range, 
primarily to bid 600. The Buyer now makes money if the item has medium value, but no 
longer gets to buy items with a high (V = 1200) value. The expected value of an item subject 
to the bid being accepted is only 345 points. Even multiplying this by 1.5, the expected payoff 
of an accepted bid is -82.5 points. Unlike a high bid, feedback isn’t going to make it obvious 
that a bid of 600 is a bad idea, because bids make money as often as they lose money and the 
expected loss isn’t enormous. Learning to bid 90 is going to be difficult unless the Buyer 
recognizes the adverse selection problem and realizes that the only way to avoid losing money 
is to bid at the lowest possible value. 
Our version of the takeover game borrows important features from Charness and Levin’s 
(2009) “shifted” versions of the takeover game. The optimal bid of B = 90 earns the Buyer a 
small but steady profit. This avoids a problem  with many versions of the takeover  game 
where optimal play calls for earning no money and essentially taking no actions by never 
buying the item. Under these circumstances, action bias (Patt and Zeckhauser, 2000) becomes 
a  plausible  cause  of  overbidding  that  cannot  be  attributed  to  a  failure  to  understand  the 
expected  payoffs  of  various  bids.  Setting  a  positive  minimum  value  also  means  that  the   7
optimal bid isn’t at the edge of the set of available bids. If pure errors play a role in bidding, it 
is  possible  to  make  an  error  that  leads  to  underbidding  as  well  as  errors  that  lead  to 
overbidding. 
While any B > 90 is suboptimal, some errors are worse than others. Bids in the ranges B < 
90, 135 ≤ B < 600, 900 ≤ B < 1200, and B ≥ 1800 never earn a positive payoff if Sellers are 
behaving optimally. Given the constant negative outcomes for bids in these categories, we 
would expect even simple reinforcement learning to quickly eliminate them.  
 
 
3  Experimental Design 
Our experiment consisted of two parts. The first part, covering Rounds 1 – 10, was identical 
in all treatments. The second part (Rounds 11 – 40) differed across treatments. The initial 
instructions for the experiment explained only Part 1, including three questions to check for 
understanding (see the appendix for a translation of the instructions). The Part 1 instructions 
told subjects that they would receive instructions for Part 2 after the conclusion of Part 1.  
In Part 1, all subjects were in the role of Buyers. Sellers were computerized and always 
sold the indivisible item if the Buyer’s bid was equal to or larger than the item’s value in a 
given period. Each subject received starting capital of 12 Euros (3000 experimental points) 
for  Part  1  from  which  possible  losses  could  be  covered.
6  After  each  round,  subjects  got 
feedback about the item’s value, whether they had bought the item or not, and how large their 
profit was. 
In Part 2 we introduced five different treatments which are explained in the following. 
1)  Control. In this treatment, Rounds 11 – 40 were identical in structure to Rounds 1 – 
10.  Hence,  all  subjects  remained  in  the  role  of  Buyers,  and  Sellers  were  again 
computerized.  This  treatment  serves  as  a  benchmark  for  the  possible  effects  of 
forming pairs of Buyers and Sellers in the following treatments. Buyers received an 
additional 10 Euros (2500 experimental points) of capital at the start of Part 2. 
2)  No Chat - Random. Here – and in the other treatments remaining to be introduced – 
we randomly assigned pairs of subjects to be teammates at the beginning of Part 2. In 
the No Chat - Random treatment, one teammate was randomly assigned to the role of 
                                                 
6 The 20 subjects who finished Part 1 with a negative balance, in spite of the starting capital, were allowed to 
continue to Part 2. These subjects were told that their Part 1 losses could be recouped in Part 2. Since all subjects 
received additional starting capital at the beginning of Part 2, only four Buyers started Part 2 with a net negative 
balance. If someone still had a loss after Part 2, it was not enforced. This was never mentioned in advance. There 
were 33 subjects (5.6%) who ended the experiment in the red. The vast majority of these subjects (21 of 33) 
come from the Control treatment.   8
Buyer in Rounds 11 – 40, and the other was assigned to the role of Seller. Subjects 
were informed about their roles before Round 11, and roles were fixed throughout Part 
2. In this treatment and in the others to follow, a Buyer never played the takeover 
game against the Seller who was his teammate. This was common knowledge. Before 
Round 11 started, subjects in both roles were asked to enter some information about 
them that was then shown to their teammate. This information included age, gender, 
field of study, population of the hometown, working status, experience in experiments, 
grades in math and German from high school exit exams (“Maturanoten”). For a more 
detailed description of what data was gathered, see Table A.1 in the Appendix. In 
addition  to  this  information,  each  member  in  the  pair  was  informed  about  their 
teammate’s total profit in Part 1. They were not shown the specific bids and values 
that led to the Part 1 profits. Other than this exchange of information, there was no 
opportunity for communication between the Buyer and the Seller in a team. 
For Part 2,  Buyers received 10 Euros (2500 experimental points) as additional 
starting  capital,  and  Sellers  received  2  Euros  (500  experimental  points).  The  total 
profits of a team’s Buyer and Seller in Part 2, including the starting capital, were 
divided equally between the teammates at the end of Part 2. This feature was stressed 
in the instructions for Part 2. Given the sharing of team profits, in practice each team 
received a joint additional endowment of 12 Euros (3000 experimental points) for Part 
2. The feedback after each period in Part 2 was the same as in Part 1 for subjects in the 
role of Buyer. Sellers got as feedback the bid of the Buyer with whom they were 
paired in a given period (recall, this was never the Buyer from the Seller’s team), the 
item’s value, whether the Seller had sold the item, and the resulting profit. Subjects 
did not receive feedback about their teammates’ outcomes. 
3)  Chat - Random. This treatment is identical to No Chat - Random, except that before 
Rounds 11, 21, and 31 the Buyer and the Seller in a team were allowed to chat with 
each other through an instant messaging program. Hence, although the roles within a 
team were again assigned randomly, Buyers and Sellers could exchange information 
and  talk  about  the  strategy  they  wanted  to  play.  The  chat  was  restricted  to  five 
minutes,  which  pilot  sessions  indicated  was  more  than  adequate  time  for  a  full 
discussion of the relevant issues. Subjects were free to say what they wanted in their 
communication, except that revealing their identity or using  abusive language was 
forbidden.   9
4)  No Chat – Endogenous. This treatment differs from No Chat - Random only in the 
way  the  roles  within  each  team  were  determined,  but  is  identical  in  every  other 
respect. After seeing the information (age, gender, etc.) about the other member of the 
team, one teammate was randomly drawn to make a proposal about the allocation of 
roles in the team. This proposal could be accompanied by a very short message of at 
most 100 characters. While the earnings from Part 1 provide a natural guide to which 
teammate  should  take  which  role,  we  gave  subjects  a  number  of  other  pieces  of 
information about their teammate to avoid creating the impression that this specific 
piece of information had to be used in assigning roles.
7 The other teammate could 
accept this proposal, and hence roles were determined accordingly, or propose roles to 
be assigned the other way round, again allowing for 100 characters to support the 
alternative proposal. If the original proposer accepted the alternative proposal, it was 
implemented. If not, roles were assigned randomly. Once determined, roles were fixed 
for Part 2. 
5)  Chat – Endogenous. This treatment is identical to Chat - Random, except that roles 
could  be  determined  endogenously  within  each  team.  In  the  five  minutes  of  chat 
before Round 11, subjects were instructed to consider the assignment of roles in their 
team, knowing that they were free to agree on either possible assignment of roles. 
When the chat was over, both teammates had to indicate in which role they wanted to 
be. If both teammates entered the same role, implying a conflict of interest, the role 
assignment was randomly determined. Otherwise, roles were assigned as requested by 
the teammates. Note that the assignment of roles could not be changed during the 
chats before Rounds 21 and 31. 
The  experiment  was  run  from  November  2009  to  April  2011  with  a  total  of  592 
participants, all of them students at the University of Innsbruck (which has a total of about 
28,000 students). Recruitment was done using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), and the sessions were 
computerized with zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) and run by the same experimenter (in order to 
avoid any kind of experimenter effects). We had 112 participants in treatment Control, and 
120 in each of the other four treatments. No subject participated in more than one session. On 
average,  an  experimental  session  lasted  90  minutes,  with  those  sessions  where  chat  was 
possible lasting 15 minutes longer (due to the threefold opportunity to chat for 5 minutes). 
                                                 
7 Several of these pieces of information could plausibly play a useful role in choosing a Buyer. For example, it 
seems  natural  that  individuals  with  high  test  scores,  particularly  at  math,  might  be  good  choices  for  the 
challenging role of a Buyer.   10
Subjects were paid their cumulative earnings converted at a rate of 250 experimental points 
per Euro. The average earnings per subject were 17 Euros. 
 
 
4  Theory and Hypotheses 
The types of settings considered in the literature on team decision making can be roughly 
divided into “eureka” problems and judgment problems.
8 A eureka problem is a problem that 
has a demonstrably correct solution. Ideally the solution should be difficult to reach without 
grasping a specific insight, but easily explained to another individual. Logic problems like the 
Wason selection task (Wason, 1966) are good examples of eureka problems.
9 We argue that 
bidding optimally in the takeover  game fits well into the framework of eureka problems. 
Given  the  results  of  previous  studies  on  the  winner’s  curse  and  the  takeover  game,  we 
anticipate subjects will have difficulty learning to bid optimally. Since the feedback in favor 
of bidding lower rather than choosing intermediate bids (i.e., B = 600) is noisy, we think it 
unlikely that Buyers will learn to bid optimally in the absence of understanding the adverse 
selection problem they face. Obviously this won’t be 100% true, as some Buyers will no 
doubt manage to bid optimally without understanding why they are doing so. The implication 
of this for our hypotheses is discussed below. 
Define any bid in the range 90 ≤ B < 135 to be an “optimal bid”. Bids in this range have 
positive expected value. Most of the optimal bids fall in the lower part of this range; 87% of 
the bids classified as optimal are either 90, 91, 95, or 100 points. 
Thinking of the takeover game as a eureka type logic problem, we define a Buyer as 
having “solved the problem” if he bids optimally (90 ≤ B < 135). Let p(t,π) be the probability 
that an individual playing the takeover game solves the problem (bids optimally), where t 
measures how long the individual has been trying to solve the problem (i.e., how many rounds 
of the takeover game have been played) and π measures the expected payoff from solving the 
problem. We assume that p(t,π) is an increasing function of t and π. Intuitively, we assume 
that individuals will learn to solve the problem over time and will expend more effort trying 
to solve the problem if the stakes are increased. 
Comparing the Control and No Chat - Random treatments, any differences in bidding 
must occur because Buyers in the No Chat - Random treatment share their payoffs with a 
                                                 
8 Judgment problems don’t have a correct solution, but instead involve arriving at a group preference. Deciding a 
level of acceptable risk (i.e. the mix of low risk bonds and riskier stocks in a portfolio) is a good example of a 
judgment problem. There is no objectively  “correct” level of risk, since individuals can have differing risk 
preferences while acting in a rational fashion.  
9 Also see Maciejovsky and Budescu (2007) for a discussion of teams solving the Wason selection task.   11
teammate.  There  is  no  communication  between  teammates,  so  Buyers  in  the  No  Chat  - 
Random treatment cannot benefit from their teammates’ insights let alone any synergies due 
to bilateral communication. Since roles are selected randomly in the No Chat - Random 
treatment, there is no reason to expect the subjects chosen to be Buyers to have higher ability 
for the task of bidding than Buyers in the Control treatment. If we assume that our subjects 
are self-regarding (only concerned with maximizing their own payoffs), the incentives to bid 
optimally are stronger  when Buyers keep their entire payoff rather than sharing it with a 
teammate. Since p(t,π) is an increasing function of π, this implies that bids will be lower in the 
Control treatment than in the No Chat – Random treatment. 
Hypothesis 1: Bids will be lower in Rounds 11 – 40 of the Control treatment than in the No 
Chat – Random treatment. 
In the Chat – Random treatment, the Buyer and Seller in a team get multiple possibilities 
to discuss bidding. If the Seller has solved the problem by learning to bid optimally, she 
should communicate her insights to the Buyer. Even if the Buyer has not previously learned to 
bid optimally, he should recognize the optimal strategy when it is explained to him and bid 
optimally in the future. This is the essence of the “truth-wins” model of team decision making 
pioneered by Lorge and Solomon (1955). A freely communicating team should perform no 
worse at solving eureka problems than the most able member of the team would perform. The 
truth-wins model has been extensively studied in the psychology literature which finds that 
while teams usually outperform the average individual, they rarely meet, let alone exceed, the 
truth-wins  benchmark  (Davis,  1992;  Kerr  and  Tindale,  2004).  There  have  been  notable 
exceptions to this general finding in the study of games (Cooper and Kagel, 2005). Even in 
the best case scenario we would not expect the truth wins model to apply exactly in the Chat 
– Random treatment since teammates cannot communicate continuously. Instead, we would 
expect  teams  to  meet  or  exceed  the  truth-wins  benchmark  in  the  rounds  immediately 
following  communication and then to learn at the same  rate as individuals in subsequent 
periods. This implies that bids will be lower in the Chat – Random treatment than in the No 
Chat – Random treatment.
10 
                                                 
10 Risk plays a role in the takeover game. Extensive evidence exists that team decision making can shift choices 
under uncertainty. Initial studies found that groups choose more risky gambles than individuals (“risky shift”), 
but subsequent studies found evidence of cautious shifts as well (Davis, 1992). In the takeover game, choosing 
an optimal bid (90 ≤ B < 135) increases expected payoffs and reduces risk. Bidding in the range 90 ≤ B < 135 is 
therefore optimal for any risk neutral or risk averse agent. Play in teams does not affect the optimal bid unless 
some individuals or teams are risk loving. Previous studies suggest that risk loving behavior is uncommon. Holt 
and Laury (2002), for example, report 8% of subjects are risk loving in their low stakes sessions (less with higher 
stakes),  and  most  of  these  are  only  modestly  risk  loving.  It  seems  unlikely  that  significant  shifts  between 
individual and team play in the takeover game are driven by the small fraction of subjects that are risk loving.   12
Hypothesis 2: Bids will be lower in Rounds 11 – 40 of the Chat – Random treatment than in 
the No Chat – Random treatment. 
Teammates cannot discuss how to bid in the No Chat – Endogenous treatment,
11 but it is 
no longer random who receives the role of Buyer. If the goal is to make as much money as 
possible, the teammates should attempt to get the most able individual in the role of Buyer 
since the role of Seller is trivial and, as shall be seen, it matters little who fills this role. The 
teammates have access to an excellent indicator for who will do a better job as the Buyer – 
their earnings from the first ten rounds. Luck plays a role in earnings, but ten rounds are 
enough that luck tends to even out. There is high correlation between bidding low in the first 
ten rounds and earnings in the first ten rounds.
12 Individuals who bid low in Rounds 1 – 10 
also tend to bid low in Rounds 11 – 40.
13 If teams systematically pick the individual who 
earned more in Rounds 1 – 10 to be the Buyer for Rounds 11 – 40, they will on average bid 
lower and earn more in Rounds 11 – 40 than teams with randomly selected roles. Note that 
this does not require that teammates share any understanding of how to bid, which is largely 
impossible by design. All that this prediction requires is that teammates follow the simple and 
intuitive rule that a Buyer who did well in the first ten rounds is also likely to do well in the 
remaining rounds. 
Hypothesis 3: Bids will be lower in Rounds 11 – 40 of the No Chat – Endogenous treatment 
than in the No Chat – Random treatment. 
We have no firm prediction about the relative size of bids in Chat – Random and No 
Chat – Endogenous. If the truth wins model exactly captured how teams function with chat 
and if teams in No Chat – Endogenous always pick the most able individual to be the Buyer, 
the  two  treatments  should  yield  identical  bids  on  average.  It  seems  unlikely  that  either 
condition  will  hold  exactly  and  we  have  no  particular  theory,  ex  ante,  about  the  relative 
departures from these predictions. 
The Chat – Endogenous treatment should be the best of all worlds. The teammates get to 
pick  who  takes  the  critical  Buyer  role.  In  choosing  roles,  they  are  not  restricted  to  the 
information they are given about each other. They are free to discuss how to bid as well as 
information about their respective bids in Rounds 1 – 10. Given a greater ability to share 
information, teammates should do a better job of picking the more able individual for the 
                                                 
11 The instructions for the short messages (100 characters) subjects send when proposing roles tell them that the 
messages are for commenting on this decision. No subject sent a message discussing how to bid. 
12 The correlation between an individual’s average bid and average points earned in Rounds 1 – 10 is -.599. This 
is statistically significant at the 1% level (t = 17.54). 
13 Looking at the Control treatment, where nothing changes between Rounds 1 – 10 and Rounds 11 – 40, the 
correlation  between  an  individual’s  average  bids  in  Rounds  1  –  10  and  Rounds  11  –  40  is  .613.  This  is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (t = 9.28).   13
Buyer  role  in  the  Chat  –  Endogenous  treatment  than  in  the  No  Chat  –  Endogenous 
treatment. The Chat – Endogenous treatment also gives teammates multiple opportunities to 
discuss the takeover game at length. If the Seller has useful insights, either initially or after a 
few rounds of play as a Seller, she can pass these on to the Buyer. With the advantages of 
better  partner  selection  and  sharing  of  ideas,  we  expect  bids  to  be  lower  in  Chat  – 
Endogenous than in No Chat – Endogenous. 
Hypothesis 4: Bids will be lower in Rounds 11 – 40 of the Chat – Endogenous treatment than 
in the No Chat – Endogenous treatment. 
Our prediction about the relative size of bids in the Chat – Endogenous and Chat – 
Random treatments depends on our confidence in the truth wins model. If the truth wins 
model  holds  exactly,  it  should  not  matter  which  teammate  takes  which  role  in  the  chat 
treatments. A high ability Seller can always pass all of her insights about bidding along to the 
Buyer even if the Buyer has low ability. If this holds, no difference is predicted between the 
two chat treatments. However, the often times poor performance of the truth wins model 
suggests that Sellers will not always share their insights about bidding and the Buyers will not 
always follow good advice.
14 If so, even with chat it should matter which teammate is selected 
to be the Buyer. Endogenous role assignment should increase the probability that the more 
able teammate (i.e. the teammate who bids lower in the first phase) becomes the Buyer. By 
extension, bids should be lower in Chat – Endogenous than in Chat – Random. 
Hypothesis 5: Bids will be lower in Rounds 11 – 40 of the Chat – Endogenous treatment than 
in the Chat – Random treatment. 
 
 
5  Results 
A.  Rounds 1 – 10: In all treatments, subjects begin the experiment by playing ten rounds as a 
Buyer facing the computer in the role of Seller. The cluster of bars on the left side of Figure 1 
shows the distribution of bids for Rounds 1 – 10. Bids have been broken into the same seven 
categories  used  in  Table  1  to  show  the  logic  of  bidding  a  low  amount.  There  are  four 
categories (B < 90, 135 ≤ B < 600, 900 ≤ B < 1200, and B ≥ 1800) where the Buyer never 
earns  money  unless  the  Seller  makes  an  error.  Choices  in  these  four  categories  can  be 
regarded as an unambiguous error, but these are rare. The remaining three categories (90 ≤ B 
                                                 
14 For inexperienced subjects, Cooper and Kagel (2011) find that about a third of the individuals who receive 
correct  advice  about  how  to  play  a  game  fail  to  follow  this  advice.  The  quality  of  the  explanation  that 
accompanies the advice does not affect this percentage.   14
< 135, 600 ≤ B < 900, and 1200 ≤ B ≤ 1800) can make money if the right value is drawn. As 
explained previously, only the first category (90 ≤ B < 135) has positive expected value. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
A little less than half of the bids are optimal (90 ≤ B < 135) in the first ten rounds. Many 
subjects immediately grasp the need to bid optimally, but many don’t. This is a scenario in 
which team play with communication should help since there will be many matches between 
an individual who doesn’t bid optimally with a subject who does. Of course, subjects don’t 
fall neatly into categories of those who “get it” and those who don’t. Only 10% of the subjects 
never  bid  optimally  in  Rounds  1  –  10  and  only  18%  always  bid  optimally.  Looking  at 
demographic  effects  on  bidding  behavior,  we  find  that  men  bid  significantly  lower  than 
women (average bids of 365 vs. 438; p < .01 in a regression not shown here) and that subjects 
with the best math grade bid lower than the other subjects (average bids of 327 vs. 422; p < 
.01). There is no significant effect from a subject’s age or German score. 
 
B.  Sellers  in  Rounds  11  –  40:  Underlying  the  hypotheses  developed  in  Section  4  is  an 
assumption that Sellers always behave optimally (in terms of maximizing monetary payoffs), 
accepting bids that are strictly greater than their value and rejecting bids strictly less than their 
value.  In  the  Control  treatment  this  happens  by  design,  but  in  the  four  treatments  with 
subjects (rather than the computer) as Sellers in Rounds 11 – 40 we can’t take this assumption 
for granted. If subjects playing as Sellers frequently make suboptimal decisions, differing 
incentives across treatments could disrupt the predicted treatment effects.  
Fortunately,  suboptimal  decisions  by  Sellers  are  relatively  rare.  Define  an  error  as 
rejecting a bid strictly greater than the item’s value or accepting a bid strictly less than the 
item’s value. Errors are observed for only 4% of observations in Rounds 11 – 40. Errors are 
more  common  when  the  bid  is  greater  than  the  value  (8%  error  rate),  but  this  primarily 
reflects cases where the difference between the bid and value is strictly less than 5 points 
(21% error rate). Once the difference between the bid and value is weakly greater than 15 
points the error rate stabilizes at 5% with little variance as the difference between the bid and 
value grows.
15 
                                                 
15 The fact that some bids that yield positive profits for the Seller are rejected suggests that other-regarding 
preferences play some role in the game, but given the low rejection rates for any substantial profit this role seems 
to be minimal. Perhaps this is unsurprising as Sellers are often making large profits and are splitting profits with 
their teammate in the Buyer role in any case.   15
It was inevitable that human Sellers would make at least some errors. The critical issues 
are whether the error rate varies across the four treatments with human Sellers and whether 
errors change the logic in favor of submitting an optimal bid (90 ≤ B < 135). To answer the 
first question, we ran a probit regression using all observations from human Sellers where an 
error was possible (i.e. bid ≠ value). Standard errors were corrected for clustering at the Seller 
level. The dependent variable was whether the Seller made a mistake. Independent variables 
included controls for the value of the item, the difference between the bid and the value 
(interacted with dummies for overbids and underbids), and the time period. The independent 
variables  of  interest  were  treatment  dummies.  There  are  no  significant  differences  in  the 
probability of a mistake between the four treatments with human Sellers.
16 
Turning to the second issue, even with Sellers’ errors it remains optimal to submit a bid in 
the range 90 ≤ B < 135. Across the four treatments with human Sellers, the average payoff in 
Rounds 11 – 40 from submitting a bid in this range was 22 points.
17 The average payoff from 
bidding optimally is unambiguously higher than the average payoff from submitting a bid in 
the range 600 ≤ B < 900 (-91 points) or the range 1200 ≤ B < 1800 (-315 points). In all four 
treatments with human Sellers, the average payoff from submitting a bid in the range 90 ≤ B < 
135 is at least 100 points higher than the average payoff from submitting a bid in the range 
600 ≤ B < 900. The difference in incentives occurs for exactly the manner predicted by the 
theory, specifically that subjects who bid just enough to get the items with the middle value 
(600 ≤ B < 900) almost always get their bid accepted for low value items (93% purchased), 
but almost never get to purchase high value items (2% purchased). Understanding adverse 
selection remains the critical insight for choosing an optimal bid. 
 
C.  Treatment  Effects  for  Buyers:  Figure  2  shows  average  bids  by  Buyers  in  all  five 
treatments. The data is broken down into ten round blocks and data is included from Rounds 1 
– 10, the rounds before the treatments are in effect, to give a sense of the differing starting 
points for the treatments. The data for Rounds 1 – 10 is taken from all subjects, including 
those who became Sellers in Rounds 11 – 40. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
                                                 
16 The base was the No Chat – Random treatment. The parameter estimates for Chat – Random, No Chat – 
Endogenous, and Chat – Endogenous are .049, .051, and -.011 respectively, with standard errors of .172, .170, 
and .191. None of these estimates are statistically significant. 
17 This is slightly higher than the theoretical prediction of 15 points due to a small number of cases where Sellers 
with high values accepted low bids.    16
In Rounds 11 – 40, bids are relatively low in the Chat – Random treatment. The bids are 
almost as low for the No Chat – Endogenous treatment in Rounds 11 – 20, but differences 
between the two treatments appear in later rounds. The big surprise is how high bids are in the 
Chat – Endogenous treatment. We hypothesized that this treatment would yield the lowest 
bids, yet bids for Rounds 11 – 20 are higher in Chat – Endogenous than in Chat – Random 
or No Chat – Endogenous. This is more notable for the fact that bids for Rounds 1 – 10 are, 
by chance, lower in Chat – Endogenous than in any other treatment. Over time, bids in Chat 
– Endogenous fall faster than in any other treatment so that bids in Rounds 31 – 40 are 
slightly lower in Chat – Endogenous than in the Chat – Random treatment. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
  The regressions reported in Table 2 are designed to provide statistical support for our 
observations about Figure 2. The dataset for these regressions includes all observations from 
our data. The dependent variable is the amount bid by the Buyer. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses.  
  An obvious feature of the data is strong individual effects. To correct for these, all of the 
models use a linear specification with fixed effects. The fixed effects  are identified  from 
choices in Rounds 1 – 10, before any of the treatments take effect. The first row of Table 2 
identifies the unit being used for the fixed effects: Models 1 and 3 use fixed effects identified 
from early choices (Rounds 1 – 10) by both members of a team while Models 2 and 4 use 
fixed effects based only on early choices by the Buyer. The different methods allow us to 
identify how much of the observed treatment effects are due to selection. This is relevant for 
the No Chat – Endogenous and Chat – Endogenous treatments where individuals who bid 
less in Rounds 1 – 10 are presumably more likely to become Buyers. If the fixed effects are at 
the team level, the estimated effects for these two treatments include the impact of selection 
because the fixed effects correction does not account for the possibility that Buyers in the No 
Chat – Endogenous and Chat – Endogenous treatments bid systematically lower than their 
teammates in Rounds 1 – 10. The estimated treatment effects will not reflect the effects of 
selection if the fixed effect is at the Buyer level since the regression now corrects for the early 
choices of individuals who were selected to be Buyers. 
Model 1 is a basic regression checking whether the treatment effects are significant either 
due to the changing behavior of Buyers or selection into the Buyer role. The baseline is the 
No Chat – Random treatment, and dummies are included for the other four treatments. The   17
results  provide  little  support  for  Hypothesis  1.  Bids  in  Rounds  11  –  40  are  lower  in  the 
Control treatment than in the No Chat – Random treatment, but the effect is weak and not 
statistically significant. Hypothesis 2 receives strong support from the data, as bids in Rounds 
11 – 40 are significantly lower in the Chat – Random treatment than in the No Chat – 
Random treatment. Hypothesis 3 also does well as bids in Rounds 11 – 40 are significantly 
lower in the No Chat – Endogenous treatment than in the No Chat – Random treatment. 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 receive no support from the regression analysis, as the estimated effect of 
the Chat – Endogenous treatment is smaller than the estimated effects for either the No Chat 
– Endogenous or Chat – Random treatments rather than larger as predicted. Unlike these 
other two treatments, the combination of chat and endogenous role selection does not lead to a 
significant improvement over the baseline.  
  In Model 2 the fixed effect is at the Buyer level, checking whether the treatments had a 
significant effect based solely on changes in Buyers’ behavior (rather than selection). This 
shouldn’t  matter  much  for  comparisons  between  treatments  where  roles  are  randomly 
selected, and indeed we continue to find little support for Hypothesis 1 while Hypothesis 2 
still receives strong support. We do not find a significant difference between the No Chat – 
Random  and  No  Chat  –  Endogenous  treatments,  consistent  with  the  treatment  effect 
identified in Model 1 being driven by selection into the Buyer role. This is not evidence 
against Hypothesis 3, but instead indicates that Hypothesis 3 is holding for the predicted 
reason.  The  most  striking  result  from  Model  2  is  the  failure  of  the  Chat  –  Endogenous 
treatment to decrease bids relative to the No Chat – Endogenous treatment (i.e. the estimated 
difference  between  the  treatments  is  positive  rather  than  negative  as  predicted).  Our 
hypotheses are based on the assumption that chatting with a teammate improves a Buyer’s 
decision making. This is true when roles are assigned randomly since, controlling for Buyer 
ability, bids are significantly lower in Chat – Random than No Chat – Random, but not 
when role assignment is endogenous. Because of this, the difference between the two chat 
treatments in Rounds 11 – 40 is significant at the 10% level and barely misses significance at 
the 5% level (t = 1.95; p = .052). 
  Looking  at  Figure  2,  it  is  clear  that  the  treatment  effects  have  a  strong  dynamic 
component. Models 3 and 4 allow for changing treatment effects by interacting the treatment 
dummies with dummies for ten round blocks (Rounds 11 – 20, Rounds 21 – 30, and Rounds 
31 – 40). The base in all cases is the No Chat – Random treatment for the current ten round 
block. Model 3 has fixed effects at the team level while Model 4 has fixed effects at the Buyer 
level. The results of Model 3 largely parallel those of Model 1. The Chat – Random and No   18
Chat  –  Endogenous  treatments  consistently  have  significant  negative  effects  on  bids, 
although in both cases the effect weakens over time. Hypothesis 1 does slightly better in 
Model 3 as the difference between No Chat – Random and the Control treatment is weakly 
significant for Rounds 11 – 20. The estimated effect of the Chat – Endogenous treatment is 
always  smaller  than  the  effects  of  the  Chat  –  Random  and  No  Chat  –  Endogenous 
treatments, although it does better over time so that by Rounds 31 – 40 the estimated effect 
(relative to No Chat – Random) is statistically significant. 
  The  most  notable  result  from  Model  4  is  that  the  difference  between  the  two  chat 
treatments dies out over time. The difference is significant at the 5% level in Rounds 11 – 20 
(t = 2.10; p = .036) and at the 10% level for Rounds 21 – 30 (t = 1.93; p = .054), but barely 
has a t-stat greater than 1 for Rounds 31 – 40 (t = 1.11; p .268). This cannot be attributed to a 
floor effect, as the average bid for Rounds 31 – 40 in the Chat – Random treatment is well 
above  135  points,  the  upper  end  of  the  optimal  bid  range,  and  only  52%  of  Buyers  bid 
optimally in all of the final ten rounds. Bids could have continued to drop in the Chat – 
Random treatment, but instead the time trend flattens out allowing the Chat – Endogenous 
treatment to catch up.
18 
In  discussing  bids  for  Rounds  1  –  10,  we  noted  that  bids  were  lower  for  men  and 
individuals with high math scores. Using just the data from the three treatments without chat, 
we have run a regression including demographic information about Buyers for Rounds 11 – 
40. The regression is an expanded version of Model 2 from Table 2 but also includes controls 
for gender, age, math score, and German score. These dummies are interacted with a dummy 
for late rounds (Rounds 11 – 40), so effects are measured controlling for the Buyer’s behavior 
in  Rounds  1  –  10.  The  gender  effect  is  largely  reversed,  with  women  bidding  (weakly) 
significantly lower in Rounds 11 – 40 relative to their bids in Rounds 1 – 10 (parameter = -
50.10; t = 1.88). This does not imply that women are bidding lower than men in Rounds 11 – 
40. Women are still bidding more than men (324 vs. 294), but the gap is narrowed relative to 
Rounds 1 – 10. The parameter estimate for math is small and not statistically significant 
(parameter = -7.08; t = 0.59). The initial advantage of individuals with high math scores is 
being picked up by the fixed effects, and the lack of a significant effect in Rounds 11 – 40 
indicates that the advantage of individuals with high math scores holds steady over time. 
                                                 
18 If we compare the effects of chat with random and endogenous role assignment, the effect of chat is getting 
weaker over time with random role assignment and stronger with endogenous role assignment. Nevertheless, 
even  in  Rounds  30  –  40  the  difference  between  No  Chat  –  Endogenous  and  Chat  –  Endogenous  is  not 
statistically significant (t = 0.93; p = .351).   19
Including demographic variables in the regressions reported on Table 2 does not affect the 
conclusions. 
  We summarize the results up to this point by revisiting our initial five hypotheses. The 
following conclusions refer to bids in Rounds 11 – 40. 
Conclusion  1:  Bids  are  lower  in  the  Control  treatment  than  in  the  No  Chat  –  Random 
treatment, but the differences are generally small and not statistically significant. We find 
little support for Hypothesis 1. 
Conclusion  2:  Bids  are  lower  in  the  Chat  –  Random  treatment  than  in  the  No  Chat  – 
Random treatment. These differences are generally large and statistically significant. The 
data supports Hypothesis 2. 
Conclusion 3: Bids are lower in the No Chat – Endogenous treatment than in the No Chat – 
Random  treatment.  These  differences  are  large  and  statistically  significant.  The  data 
supports Hypothesis 3. 
Conclusion 4: Bids are higher in the Chat – Endogenous treatment than in either the No 
Chat  –  Endogenous  or  Chat  Random  treatments.  Bids  in  Chat  –  Endogenous  are  not 
significantly lower than in the baseline (No Chat – Random). The data does not support 
Hypotheses 4 and 5. 
Conclusion 5: Controlling for Buyer ability, including chat improves Buyer performance (i.e. 
lowers bids) when roles are randomly assigned but not when roles are endogenously chosen. 
 
D. Comparing Buyers to Sellers in the Endogenous Treatments: Contrary to Hypotheses 4 
and  5,  bids  are  higher  in  the  Chat  –  Endogenous  treatment  than  in  the  No  Chat  – 
Endogenous and Chat – Random treatments. This is surprising since teams in the Chat – 
Endogenous treatment should have the dual advantages of chat and putting the more able 
individual in the role of Buyer. Comparing the results of Models 1 and 2 (or Models 3 and 4) 
in Table 2 suggests that selection is stronger in the No Chat – Endogenous treatment than in 
the Chat – Endogenous treatment. This subsection supports this conjecture by comparing the 
characteristics  of  subjects  who  become  Buyers  and  Sellers  in  the  two  treatments  with 
endogenous role assignment. 
Table 3 compares Buyers and Sellers along a number of dimensions. Recall that prior to 
selecting a Buyer the subjects were given information about their teammate’s age, gender, 
math score, German score, and earnings in Rounds 1 – 10. Table 3 shows, for each of these 
characteristics, the average values for subjects who ended up in the roles of Buyer and Seller 
broken down by treatment. The final row of Table 3 shows average bids in Rounds 1 – 10.   20
Although subjects did not know the average bids of their teammate in Rounds 1 – 10, this is a 
natural measure of who showed more ability in the early rounds. For each characteristic in 
each treatment, we ran a t-test of the null hypothesis that the mean difference between the 
Buyer and Seller in a pair equals zero.
19 The third column for each treatment reports the 
resulting t-stat. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
For both chat treatments, none of the demographic characteristics (age, gender, math and 
German scores) differ significantly between Buyers and Sellers. Buyers in the No Chat – 
Endogenous treatment had significantly higher earnings and lower bids in Rounds 1 – 10 
than  the  Sellers  they  were  paired  with.  As  expected,  endogenous  selection  of  roles 
systematically puts individuals who do well in Rounds 1 – 10 into the Buyer role. This is less 
true  for  the  Chat  –  Endogenous  treatment.  There  is  virtually  no  difference  between  the 
Buyers’ and Sellers’ earnings in Rounds 1 – 10. More importantly (since earnings are partially 
a matter of luck), the Buyers’ average bid in Rounds 1 – 10 is lower than the Sellers’ average 
bid but the difference between Buyers and Sellers is less than half as large in the Chat – 
Endogenous treatment as in the No Chat – Endogenous treatment. Buyers in the Chat – 
Endogenous treatment do not have significantly lower bids in Rounds 1 – 10 than the Sellers 
they are paired with. 
Conclusion 6: Buyers in the No Chat – Endogenous treatment earn significantly more and 
bid significantly less in Rounds 1 – 10 than the Sellers they are paired with. Neither statement 
is true for the Chat – Endogenous treatment. 
 
E. Does It Matter Who Becomes the Buyer? It would matter little whether Buyers bid less 
than Sellers for Rounds 1 – 10 if teams performed the same regardless of which teammate 
took which role. Figure 3 shows otherwise. This figure compares the average bid in Rounds 
11 – 40 for teams where the teammate who bid (strictly) lower on average in Rounds 1 – 10 
becomes the Buyer with teams where the teammate who bid lower becomes the Seller. The 
data is subdivided into the two treatments with teams and no chat (No Chat – Random and 
No Chat – Endogenous) and the two treatments with teams and chat (Chat – Random and 
Chat – Endogenous). 
 
                                                 
19 The number of observations for each test is 60, the number of pairs in each treatment. An observation consists 
of the difference between the Buyer and Seller in a pair for the characteristic in question.   21
Figure 3 about here 
 
In both cases the average bid for Rounds 11 – 40 is lower when the teammate who bid 
lower in Rounds 1 – 10 is given the role of Buyer. The effect is quite a bit stronger in the 
treatments without chat  than in those with chat. With chat, a Seller who understands the 
benefits of bidding low can pass this understanding on to the Buyer. This should lead to lower 
bids and average bids depending less on the identity of the Buyer with chat, exactly  the 
patterns observed in Figure 3. The extreme case of this is the truth wins model, which predicts 
that the identity of the Buyer is irrelevant in the treatments with chat because Buyers and 
Sellers  perfectly  share  insights,  implying  teams  perform  no  worse  than  their  most  able 
member. The data shown in Figure 3 is not consistent with the truth wins model, but it would 
be surprising if teams performed as well as the truth wins benchmark in our experiment since 
teammates only talk once every ten rounds.
20 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
  The regressions shown in Table 4 put the preceding observations on a firm statistical 
footing and further explore the performance of the truth wins model. For both regressions the 
dependent variable is a team’s average bid for Rounds 11 – 40.
21 Model 1 includes data from 
all four treatments with teams. The independent variables are a dummy for the two treatments 
with chat, an interaction between a dummy for treatments without chat and a dummy for 
teams where the Buyer is the teammate who bid lower (on average) in Rounds 1 – 10, and an 
interaction between a dummy for treatments with chat and a dummy for teams where the 
Buyer is the teammate who bid lower (on average) in Rounds 1 – 10. The parameter estimate 
for the first of the interaction terms is large and significant at the 1% level. Not surprisingly, 
bids in Rounds 11 – 40 are very sensitive to the Buyer’s identity when the teammates cannot 
communicate.  The  parameter  estimate  for  the  second  interaction  term  is  smaller,  but  still 
                                                 
20 Teammates actually observe earnings for Rounds 1 – 10 rather than bids. If we use earnings in Rounds 1 – 10 
rather than bids in Rounds 1 – 10 to separate teams into categories for Figure 3, we get a similar pattern (teams 
who end up with the player with higher earnings as the Buyer bid less in Rounds 11 – 40) but the magnitude of 
the effect is weakened, especially with chat. This reflects the random element of earnings, as a subject who bids 
optimally but receives a bad draw on values may not have particularly high earnings. 
21 Fixed effects are not used here because these would be collinear with the independent variables. As an extreme 
version of controlling for individual effects, we have used the average bid in Rounds 11 – 40 for each Buyer as a 
single observation. We have run equivalent regressions where each bid is an observation, giving us 30 bids per 
Buyer. We correct for the individual effects by clustering at the Buyer level. This approach yields results that are 
essentially identical to those reported in Table 4.   22
significant at the 5% level. Consistent with our impression from Figure 3, who becomes the 
Buyer is less important when teammates can chat, but still matters. 
  Model 2 only includes data from the two treatments with chat. The independent variables 
are the Buyer’s and Seller’s average bids for Rounds 1 – 10 interacted with dummies for the 
Buyer being the low bidder (on average) in Rounds 1 – 10 and the Seller being the low bidder 
in Rounds 1 – 10. (Note that we are referring to the Seller who is the Buyer’s teammate, not 
one of the Sellers he is playing against.) Under the truth wins model, a team’s performance 
should be equivalent to the performance of its more able member. This implies that bids in 
Rounds 11 – 40 should depend more strongly on the bids in Rounds 1 – 10 of the teammate 
who bid lower (and hence is presumably more able). When the Buyer was the low bidder, this 
prediction  is  confirmed.  The  estimate  for  the  Buyer’s  average  bid  in  Rounds  1  –  10  is 
significant at the 5% level while the estimate for the Seller’s average bid is smaller and not 
significant. The results do not look as good for the truth wins model if the Seller was the low 
bidder. The estimate for the Buyer’s average bid is now significant at the 1% level. The effect 
of the Seller’s average bid once again is small and not significant. Even if the Seller was the 
more able bidder in Rounds 1 – 10 and the Seller can communicate her insights with the 
Buyer, bids in Rounds 11 – 40 are more strongly influenced by the Buyer’s early behavior 
than the Seller’s. Moreover, the relationship between bids in Rounds 11 – 40 and bids by the 
Buyer and Seller in Rounds 1 – 10 does not depend on whether the Buyer or the Seller bid 
lower in Rounds 1 – 10. “Buyer wins” would be a more accurate description of our data than 
“truth wins”. It follows that even with chat it matters which teammate is chosen as the Buyer. 
Conclusion 7: Both without and with chat, teams where the Buyer bid lower than the Seller in 
Rounds 1 – 10 have lower bids in Rounds 11 – 40. Even with chat, bids in Rounds 11 – 40 
depend far more strongly on the Buyer’s behavior in Rounds 1 – 10 than the Seller’s early 
behavior. 
 
F. Content of Conversations: We would expect bids in Rounds 11 – 40 to be equal in the 
Chat – Random and Chat – Endogenous treatments if the only problem in the Chat – 
Endogenous treatment was a failure to select the more able individual as the Buyer. The fact 
that bids are higher in the Chat – Endogenous treatment, significantly so after controlling for 
selection into the Buyer role, suggests that something else must be going on. To determine 
what  that  something  else  might  be,  we  turn  to  the  content  of  the  conversation  between 
teammates.   23
We focus on the conversations that took place between Round 10 and Round 11. In both 
treatments with  chat, this time period  gave teammates an opportunity  to discuss how the 
takeover game should be played. In the Chat – Endogenous treatment it also gave them an 
opportunity  to  discuss  who  should  take  which  role.  Recall  that  subjects  were  given  five 
minutes to chat and could not move on to the next stage of the experiment until the five 
minutes had elapsed. The goal was to give subjects adequate time to discuss how to bid and 
(when relevant) role selection without any incentive to rush through the conversation to make 
the experiment shorter. Subjects indeed chatted extensively, with the average team sending 
25.0 messages during the five minutes. Teams in the Chat – Random treatment sent slightly 
more messages on average than teams in the Chat – Endogenous treatment, 26.2 vs. 23.8 
(t=1.41; p > 0.1), even though teams in the Chat – Random treatment did not need to discuss 
who took which role. 
Looking  at  what  teams  said,  we  see  significant  differences  between  the  two  chat 
treatments. We coded every team for whether they discussed how to bid and, as a subcategory 
of this, if they specifically discussed the benefits of bidding low. The coding was initially 
done independently by two research assistants. We then had the two coders discuss all the 
discrepancies in the coding and agree on a single decision for coding. This final coding was 
used for the analysis to be reported in the following. We allowed for the possibility that even 
after discussion the coders would not agree on a coding. In these rare cases (1 observation) the 
coding was assigned a value of ½. Using a single coding simplifies our discussion of the chat 
content but has little effect on our conclusions since there was a high degree of agreement 
between the two initial codings.
22  
In the Chat – Random treatment, 78% of the teams discussed how to bid, but in the Chat 
– Endogenous treatment only 61% of the teams did so. This difference is significant at the 
5% level (t=2.12). A similar pattern occurs if we look at teams that specifically discussed 
bidding low. This occurred more frequently in the Chat – Random treatment (63%) than in 
the  Chat  –  Endogenous  treatment  (35%)  with  the  difference  significant  at  the  1%  level 
(t=3.12). Not only do teams with chat do a poor job of endogenously selecting roles, they also 
do  a  poor  job  of  discussing  how  to  play  the  takeover  game.  This  parallels  our  previous 
observation that, controlling for Buyer  ability, chat did not improve  Buyers’  choices  (i.e. 
lower bids) when role assignment is endogenous. 
                                                 
22 The cross-coder correlation was 0.55 for the category “discussed how to bid” and 0.49 for “bidding low”, both 
significant at the 5% level. An average cross-coder correlation of around 0.5 (as in our case) is well accepted in 
social psychology (see, e.g., Orbell et al., 1988).   24
One  possible  explanation  for  the  paucity  of  substantive  conversations  in  the  Chat  – 
Endogenous treatment is the time constraint. Even with the generous time provided for chat, 
if  teams  spend  most  of  this  time  discussing  who  should  take  which  role  it  may  leave 
insufficient time to discuss how to bid. Two features of the data argue that the time constraint 
is not playing an important role in reducing discussions of bidding. First, the chat content for 
teams that talk up to the time constraint isn’t much different from those who don’t. The 41 
teams in the Chat – Endogenous treatment that sent a message in the last 20 seconds (and 
hence  are  plausibly  time  constrained)  were  slightly,  but  insignificantly,  more  likely  than 
average to have discussed how to bid (65% vs. 67% for all 60 teams) and to have specifically 
discussed  bidding  low  (37%  vs.  35%  for  all  60  teams).  Second,  the  vast  majority  of  the 
discussions  on  role  selection  were  short.  The  most  common  pattern  was  that  one  of  the 
teammates proposed a role, the other accepted  the proposal,  and they  moved on to other 
things.
23 The rapid selection of roles left ample time to discuss bidding, yet many teams failed 
to do so. 
The relative failure of teams in the Chat – Endogenous treatment to discuss bidding in 
general, especially bidding low, largely explains why bids are significantly higher than in the 
Chat – Random treatment after controlling for selection into the Buyer role. With Buyer 
fixed effects, the estimated difference between the two chat treatments in Rounds 11 – 40 is 
91.26 with a robust standard error of 46.86 (see discussion of Model 2 in Table 2). If this 
regression is modified to include a control for whether the team discussed bidding low, the 
estimated difference drops to 47.37 with a robust standard error of 45.58. The difference 
between  the  treatments  is  halved  and  is  no  longer  statistically  significant.  Likewise,  with 
Buyer fixed effects, the estimated difference between the chat treatments in Rounds 11 – 20 is 
111.40 with a robust standard error of 53.02 (see Model 4 in Table 2). Adding a control for 
whether the team discussed bidding low reduces the estimated difference to 67.52 with a 
robust standard error of 50.21. Again, the estimated difference is no longer significant. Hence, 
even with a fairly crude control for what is being said between Rounds 10 and 11, a large 
fraction  of  the  higher  bids  in  Chat  –  Endogenous  relative  to  Chat  –  Random  can  be 
accounted for. 
                                                 
23 The following exchange is typical:  
Subject A: Seller or buyer? 
Subject B: buyer 
Subject A: ok 
Subject B: ok  
Subject B: and you? 
Subject A: I try it as seller then 
Subject B: perfect   25
Conclusion 7: Teams in Chat – Endogenous send fewer messages between Rounds 10 and 
11, are significantly less likely to discuss bidding, and are significantly less likely to discuss 
bidding  low  than  teams  in  Chat  –  Random.  Controlling  for  differences  in  chat  content 
explains  a  large  fraction  of  why  bids  are  higher  in  Chat  –  Random  than  in  Chat  – 
Endogenous. 
Examining the content of messages in more detail also gives us insight into why teams in 
Chat – Endogenous do a poor job of selecting the right person to be the Buyer. We define a 
team as having had a “good negotiation” if one of the teammates proposed an assignment of 
roles, the other teammate accepted this proposal, and the players actually ended up being 
assigned to the agreed upon roles. Out of 60 teams in Chat – Endogenous, only 36 had good 
negotiations. The teams that had good negotiations generally did a decent job of assigning the 
right person to the right role – the player who bid lower in Rounds 1 – 10 was assigned the 
Buyer role for 25 of these teams and the average bid in Rounds 1 – 10 of Buyers was 316 
versus 396 for Sellers. However, 24 teams did not have a good negotiation. In 8 of these 
teams none of the team members proposed a role during the chat conversation. In another 8 
the teammates didn’t reach an agreement. Finally, there are 8 teams where the teammates 
reached an agreement but didn’t end up in the agreed upon roles; in other words, at least one 
teammate reneged on the agreement. The teams that don’t have good negotiations do a poor 
job of getting the right person in the Buyer role. The teammate who bid lower in Rounds 1 – 
10 was assigned the Buyer role for 14 of these 24 teams and the average bid in Rounds 1 – 10 
of Buyers was 402 versus 426 for Sellers. The poor assignment of teammates to roles in Chat 
– Endogenous is largely due to failure to reach and abide by agreements on roles. 
These failures cannot easily be attributed to subjects failing to understand that they were 
supposed to discuss role assignment or that they would be choosing roles endogenously. After 
all,  teams  did  well  at  role  assignment  in  the  No  Chat  –  Endogenous  treatment.  The 
instructions  about  role  assignment  are  similar  for  the  two  treatments.  More  teams  sent 
messages about role assignment in Chat – Endogenous (54 out of 60 teams)
24 than in No 
Chat – Endogenous (8 out of 60 teams), and the length of the discussions was greater (for 
obvious reasons) in Chat – Endogenous. While teams seem to understand they need to assign 
roles,  they  don’t  necessarily  view  this  as  a  critical  decision.  Their  discussions  of  role 
assignment  are  typically  brief  and  miss  basic  points.  It  is  striking  that  not  a  single  team 
discussed the importance of picking the right person (i.e. the person who had performed better 
                                                 
24 This is more than the number of teams where a proposal about role assignments was made because there were 
two teams in Chat – Endogenous that discussed role assignment without ever making any proposals.   26
in Rounds 1 – 10) for the role of Buyer. Having to discuss bidding and role assignment 
degrades the quality of teams’ discussions of both issues. 
 
6  Conclusion 
The primary purpose of our study was to investigate the relationship between how roles 
are assigned within a work team and team performance. As expected, we found that teams 
perform better when roles are assigned endogenously or teammates are allowed to chat about 
their  decisions.  The  big  surprise  is  that  the  interaction  effect  between  endogenous  role 
assignment and chat harms team performance, leading to higher bids rather than lower bids as 
expected. Digging deeper, teams in the Chat – Endogenous treatment both do a poor job of 
selecting which teammate should take on the Buyer role and in discussing how to bid.  
Time constraints do not provide a good explanation for the relatively poor quality of the 
discussions in the Chat – Endogenous treatment, but time is not the only constraint teams 
may face. There is extensive evidence from the psychology literature on “ego depletion” (e.g. 
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice, 1998; Schmeichel, Vohs, and Baumeister, 2003) 
that individuals only have a limited budget of cognitive resources. If they are forced to expend 
some of their cognitive resources on one task, they are less able to perform other tasks. For 
example, individuals who must exercise self control to eat a healthy food (radishes) when a 
more  tempting  alternative  (chocolate)  is  available  subsequently  expend  less  effort  and 
perform worse at solving logic problems than subjects in control treatments. The effect of ego 
depletion is particularly strong for intellective tasks. Unlike the Chat – Random and No 
Chat – Endogenous treatments, in the Chat – Endogenous treatment subjects must deal with 
multiple intellective tasks (discussing how to bid and the best way to assign roles) while 
exercising self-control (as seen through the strong tendency to defer to teammates’ requests). 
This is exactly the sort of environment that typically depletes cognitive resources, leading to 
poor performance on logic tasks like bidding in the takeover game. We conjecture that ego 
depletion plays an important role in driving our primary results and hope to collect direct 
evidence testing this hypothesis in future research.  
Our  results  sound  a  cautionary  note  about  increased  worker  participation.  Increased 
worker participation has obvious positive aspects. Workers who feel greater connection with 
the group and greater accountability to their work group are likely to work harder and think 
more carefully about the problems facing their work group. Workers also often have valuable 
information  that  can  be  passed  on  to  their  employers  if  they  are  given  an  opportunity. 
However,  allowing  workers  to  play  a  greater  role  has  the  side  effect  of  increasing  their   27
cognitive load. If individuals only have a limited amount of cognitive energy to expend, this 
risks reducing their performance at all tasks. Future researchers need to think carefully about 
what tasks are best handled by a manager and what tasks are best left to workers. 
Our study is not intended to find the optimal method of assigning teammates to roles. In 
designing our experiments, our goal was to examine how endogenous role assignment links to 
team performance and whether endogenous role assignment is unambiguously positive for 
teams in settings where role assignment is important. The experimental design was tailored to 
this goal, choosing a task that strongly emphasizes the importance of role selection and only 
allowing extreme methods of role allocation, either completely random and exogenous or 
completely controlled by team members. In future research we plan to explore alternative 
methods of selecting roles that combine the strengths of endogenous role selection with the 
strengths of having a manager responsible for role selection as well as looking at mechanisms 
for role assignment in a broader selection of environments.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Bidding strategies 
Bid  Value  1.5 * Expected 
Value if Accepted  Ever Profitable?  90  600  1200 
Bid < 90  Reject  Reject  Reject  N/A  No 
90 ≤ Bid < 135  Accept  Reject  Reject  135  Yes 
135 ≤ Bid < 600  Accept  Reject  Reject  135  No 
600 ≤ Bid < 900  Accept  Accept  Reject  517.5  Yes 
900 ≤ Bid < 1200  Accept  Accept  Reject  517.5  No 
1200 ≤ Bid < 1800  Accept  Accept  Accept  945  Yes 
Bid ≥ 1800  Accept  Accept  Accept  945  No 
 31 
 
Table 2: Regressions for Treatment Effects 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Fixed Effects  Team  Buyer  Team  Buyer 
Rounds 11 – 40 * Control  -47.68 
(32.15) 
-15.27 
(33.14)     
Rounds 11 – 40 *         






(43.91)     
Rounds 11 – 40 *            





(37.77)     
Rounds 11 – 40 *         




(41.62)     





Rounds 11 – 20 *         






Rounds 11 – 20 *            





Rounds 11 – 20 *         








Rounds 21 – 30 *         






Rounds 21 – 30 *            





Rounds 21 – 30 *         








Rounds 31 – 40 *         





Rounds 31 – 40 *            





Rounds 31 – 40 *         






Notes: All regressions include 16,480 observations from 592 individuals (352 teams). Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.    32
Table 3: Average Characteristics of Buyers and Sellers 
 
  No Chat – Endogenous    Chat – Endogenous 
  Buyer  Seller  |t-stat|    Buyer  Seller  |t-stat| 
Age (in categories)
a  4.63  4.93  0.89  5.00  4.62  1.07 
Gender
b  .583  .483  1.14  .533  .467  0.68 
Math Score  2.33  2.55  1.18  2.33  2.42  0.46 
German Score
c  2.18  2.20  0.11  2.33  2.50  1.26 
Earnings 
Rounds 1 – 10
d  -346  -810  2.25
**  -363  -343  0.09 
Bid, Rounds. 1 - 10  364  494  3.24
***  351  408  1.36 
 
Notes: Three (***), two (**), and one (*) stars indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels respectively.  
a Age was coded as follows: 0=18 years or younger; 1=19 years; 2=20 years; 3=21 years; 
4=22 years; 5=23 years; 6=24 years; 7=25 years; 8=26 years or older. 
b Gender was coded as follows: 0 = Male; 1 = Female. 
c Lower grades are better in the Austrian school system. Grades were coded from 1 to 5. 
d Earnings do not include the starting capital of 3000 experimental points. 
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Table 4: Does the Buyer’s Identity Matter? 
 
  Model 1  Model 3 
Dataset  All Team Sessions  Chat Sessions 





(25.16)   
No Chat * 




(17.74   
Chat * 




(18.19)   
Buyer’s Avg. Bid, Rounds 1 – 10 





Sellers’s Avg. Bid, Rounds 1 – 10 
Buyer Low Bidder 
 
  .124 
(.095) 
Buyer’s Avg. Bid, Rounds 1 – 10 





Sellers’s Avg. Bid, Rounds 1 – 10 
Seller Low Bidder    .141 
(.169) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Three (***), two (**), and one (*) 



























Figure 1: Distribution of Bids
 Bid < 90 90 ≤ Bid < 135 135 ≤ Bid < 600 600 ≤ Bid < 900




















Figure 2: Average Bids
Control No Chat - Random Chat - Random








































Figure 3: The Effect of Buyer Selection
Buyer Bid Lower in Rounds 1 - 10 Seller Bid Lower in Rounds 1 - 10  36
Not Intended for Publication 
Appendix – Experimental instructions 
 
Instructions for the experiment 
 
Welcome to this experiment! Thank you for taking your time to participate. Please refrain 
from talking to other participants until the experiment is finished. In case you have any 
questions after we have read through the instructions, please raise your hand and an 
experimenter will come to your seat and will answer it. 
 
Two parts of the experiment 
This experiment has two parts. In the following, you’ll get the instructions for part 1. The 
instructions for part 2 will be distributed at the end of part 1. 
 
Instructions for part 1 
 
Initial endowment 
For part 1 you get an initial endowment of 12 €. This endowment will be included in the profit 
for the first period. 
 
Number of periods 
Part 1 has 10 periods. In each single period, you can buy cards, the value of which will be 
determined randomly. We will now explain the exact procedure within each period. 
 
Submitting bids for a card in each period 
In each period, you can submit a bid for a card that has a certain nominal value. This nominal 
value will be determined randomly in each period. A card can have three possible nominal 
values (in points): 
·  90 
·  600 
·  1,200 
Each of these three values is equally likely to be drawn. In other words, this means that each 
nominal value will be realized with a probability of 1/3. The realization of nominal values is 
independent across periods. This means that the realization in the preceding period has no 
influence whatsoever on the realization in the current period. 
 
You will submit a bid for a card before you learn about the realized nominal value. The bid 
must be an integer number in the interval from 0 (zero) to 2,000 (with 0 and 2,000 included in 
the interval). The actual nominal value will be determined after you have submitted your bid. 
 
Profits from bids 
If your bid is larger or equal to the nominal value of the card, then you buy the card. In this 
case you get 150% of the card’s nominal value. However, you also have to buy the card in 
this case. 
 
If your bid is smaller than the nominal value, then you don’t buy the card. This means that no 
transaction takes place, and you don’t earn anything in this case. 
 
An example:   37
Consider the case in which you bid 712 for the card: 
1.  Assume that the card’s nominal value is 600. In this case, you buy the card. This 
means that you receive 600 * 1.5 = 900 points. You have to pay 712 according to your 
bid. This yields a profit of 188 (= value of 900 to you as the buyer – bid of 712). 
2.  Assume that the card’s nominal value is 90. Then you buy the card and it is worth 135 
for you (= 90 * 1.5). In this case your profit is negative: -577(= 135 – 712). 
3.  Assume that the card’s nominal value is 1,200. Then you don’t buy the card and this 
period’s profit is 0 for you. 
 
At the end of each period you will see an ”outcome screen“, on which there is a list that 
contains for all previous periods the following information: your bid, the nominal value of the 
card, whether you have bought the card or not, and the profit. 
 
At the end the experiment all profits of each period will be added up and paid to you. The 
exchange rate of points earned in the experiment into Euros is the following: 
 




Some examples to be worked on before the start of part 1 
 
Assume you bid 128 and the card’s nominal value is 90. How much do you earn? 
 
Assume you bid 767 and the card’s nominal value is 1,200. How much do you earn? 
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Instructions for part 2 
 
Roles of buyers and sellers 
Part 2 is similar to part 1. However, in this part there will be buyers and sellers of cards. The 
task that each role has to perform is explained below. 
 
Number of periods 
Part 2 has 30 periods. 
 
Fixed pairs and how to assign roles 
It is important in this part that at the beginning of it, fixed pairs of buyers and sellers will be 
formed. These pairs will remain fixed throughout the whole part 2.The fixed pairs have a 
strong influence on the profits from this part (see more on this at the end of the instructions 
for part 2!). 
 
At the beginning of part 2 you will have an option to exchange messages with the partner in 
your pair. For this purpose, we have installed an instant-messaging-program in the software. 
In order to use it, you have to write your message into the empty row at the bottom of your 
screen, and then you have to push “Enter” to send your message to your partner. Once you 
send you send a message, it is shown on your partner’s screen and on your screen (above the 
empty row). Note that no other participant in the room can see your message. 
 
You can send any message you like, expect for the following limitations: 
·  Please do not reveal your identity. This also includes information that allows your 
personal identification. 
·  Please do not use any abusive language. 
 
Before you can start using the instant-messaging-program, you’ll receive some information 
about the partner in your pair. More precisely, you’ll be informed about his or her age, 
gender, field of study, population of hometown, working status, experience with economic 
experiments and the profit in part 1. 
 
At the end of the 5 minutes of chatting in the instant-messaging-program, you need to indicate 
whether you would prefer to be buyer or seller. If one person in a pair indicates a preference 
for being in the role of buyer, and the other person indicates a preference for the role of seller, 
then the roles will be assigned exactly as preferred by both members of the pair. If this is not 
the case, then roles will be assigned randomly. 
 
Before period 21 and 31 you will again have 5 minutes time to exchange messages with your 
partner. Roles may not be changed in the course of communication before these periods, 
however. As soon as the periods start, no further communication is possible. 
 
Interaction of buyers and sellers 
In each period there will be an interaction between a buyer and a seller, in which they decide 
about buying, or respectively selling, a card. It is very important to note that you will never 
interact with the partner in your team! This means that if you are a buyer, for example, you 
will never trade with the seller in your pair, and vice versa. 
In each period, it will be randomly determined which buyer will interact with which seller 
(taking care of the limitation that interaction within pairs is impossible). In each period it is 
equally likely to interact with any of the participants in the opposite role of yours. Recall that 
the interaction always takes place with someone from a different pair.   39
 
How to buy a card in each period 
Buyers are in the same situation as all participants were in part 1 of the experiment. In each 
period you can bid in the role of buyer for a card. The card’s nominal value will be 
determined randomly as in part 1. To remember: the nominal value may be 90, 600, or 1,200, 
with equal probability. 
 
In each period, you have to submit a bid as an integer number from 0 to 2,000, including both 
0 and 2,000. The card’s nominal value will be determined and revealed after you have placed 
your bid. 
 
As the buyer, you get an initial endowment of 10 € for part 2, and as seller you get 2 €. This 
endowment will be added to the profit in the first period of part 2. However, please note the 
rules for determining payoffs within pairs at the end of this set of instructions! 
 
Selling a card in each period and profits of the seller 
In the role of seller you are the owner of the card that can be sold in each period and for which 
the buyer places a bid. You can earn money in the role of seller if you sell the card to the 
buyer. You will be informed about the card’s nominal value (either 90, 600, or 1,200) and the 
buyer’s bid before you decide whether or not to sell your card. If you sell the card, then you 
earn the buyer’s bid minus the card’s nominal value. For example, if the card has a 
nominal value of 600 and the buyer has bid 712, then you earn 112 points if you sell the card. 
Assume that the card had a nominal value of 600, the buyer bid 457 and you sold it, then you 
lose 143 points. Whenever you don’t sell the card, then you don’t earn anything in this period, 
but you also don’t lose anything. 
 
 
Profits from buying a card 
As in part 1, a buyer gets 150% of the card’s nominal value if the seller sold it to him or her. 
Once the seller has sold the card, the buyer has to buy it. 
 
An example: 
Assume that in the role of buyer you have bid 712 points and that the realized nominal value 
is 600: 
1.  If the seller sells the card, then the buyer earns 188 points ( = 600 * 1,5 – 712) 
2.  If the seller does not sell the card, then the buyer earns zero. 
 
Feedback 
At the end of each period you will see an “outcome screen“ on which you’ll see for all 
previous periods of part 2 the following information: the card’s nominal value, the buyer’s 
bid, whether the seller has sold the card, and your profit. 
 
Rules for profits within pairs 
At the end of the experiment, all profits from each period of part 2 will be added up. Then the 
profits of the buyer and the seller within a pair will be summed and both members of the pair 
will receive exactly one half of the joint profits from part 2. This includes also sharing the 
initial endowments from the beginning of part 2. The exchange rate is again: 
 
2.5points = 0.01 €. 
 




Table A.1. Demographic data collected at the end of part 1 of the experiment. 
Variable  Coding 
Age  0=18  years  or  younger;  1=19  years;  2=20  years;  3=21  years; 
4=22 years; 5=23 years; 6=24 years; 7=25 years; 8=26 years or 
older. 
Gender  1=female; 0=male. 
Field of study  0=economics  and  business;  1=medicine;  2=political  science; 
3=psychology; 4=sociology; 5=other. 
Population of hometown  0=under  5.000;  1=5.000  to  10.000;  2=10.000  to  25.000; 
3=25.000 to 50.000; 4=50.000 to 100.000; 5=100.000 to 500.000; 
6=more than 500.000. 
Working status  0=Full time student; 1=Full time student plus part time worker; 
2=Full time student and full time worker; 3=Part time student; 
4=Part time student and part time worker; 5=Part time student 
and  full  time  worker;  6=neither  student  nor  worker;  7=No 
student, but part time worker; 8=No student, but full time worker. 
Experience  with 
experiments 
0=never participated before; 1=1 to 3 times participated; 2=4 to 
10 times participated; 3=11 to 20 times participated; 4=more than 
20 times participated. 
Math  grade  in  high-
school  leaving  exam 
(“Matura”) 
Grades range from 1 to 5 (in integers). “1” is the best grade, “5” 
the worst. 
German  grade  in  high-
school  leaving  exam 
(“Matura”) 




 University of Innsbruck - Working Papers in Economics and Statistics
Recent Papers can be accessed on the following webpage:
http://eeecon.uibk.ac.at/wopec/
2011-14 David J. Cooper, Matthias Sutter: Role selection and team performance
2011-13 Wolfgang H ochtl, Rupert Sausgruber, Jean-Robert Tyran: Inequality
aversion and voting on redistribution
2011-12 Thomas Windberger, Achim Zeileis: Structural breaks in ination dyna-
mics within the European Monetary Union
2011-11 Loukas Balafoutas, Adrian Beck, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Matthias
Sutter: What drives taxi drivers? A eld experiment on fraud in a market for
credence goods
2011-10 Stefan Borsky, Paul A. Raschky: A spatial econometric analysis of com-
pliance with an international environmental agreement on open access re-
sources
2011-09 Edgar C. Merkle, Achim Zeileis: Generalized measurement invariance
tests with application to factor analysis
2011-08 Michael Kirchler, J urgen Huber, Thomas St ockl: Thar she bursts -
reducing confusion reduces bubbles modied version forthcoming in
American Economic Review
2011-07 Ernst Fehr, Daniela R utzler, Matthias Sutter: The development of ega-
litarianism, altruism, spite and parochialism in childhood and adolescence
2011-06 Octavio Fern andez-Amador, Martin G achter, Martin Larch, Georg
Peter: Monetary policy and its impact on stock market liquidity: Evidence
from the euro zone
2011-05 Martin G achter, Peter Schwazer, Engelbert Theurl: Entry and exit of
physicians in a two-tiered public/private health care system
2011-04 Loukas Balafoutas, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Matthias Sutter: Distribu-
tional preferences and competitive behavior forthcoming in
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
2011-03 Francesco Feri, Alessandro Innocenti, Paolo Pin: Psychological pressure
in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment:
Comment2011-02 Christian Kleiber, Achim Zeileis: Reproducible Econometric Simulations
2011-01 Carolin Strobl, Julia Kopf, Achim Zeileis: A new method for detecting
dierential item functioning in the Rasch model
2010-29 Matthias Sutter, Martin G. Kocher, Daniela R utzler and Stefan
T. Trautmann: Impatience and uncertainty: Experimental decisions predict
adolescents' eld behavior
2010-28 Peter Martinsson, Katarina Nordblom, Daniela R utzler and Matt-
hias Sutter: Social preferences during childhood and the role of gender and
age - An experiment in Austria and Sweden Revised version forthcoming in
Economics Letters
2010-27 Francesco Feri and Anita Gantner: Baragining or searching for a better
price? - An experimental study. Revised version accepted for publication in
Games and Economic Behavior
2010-26 Loukas Balafoutas, Martin G. Kocher, Louis Putterman and Matt-
hias Sutter: Equality, equity and incentives: An experiment
2010-25 Jes us Crespo-Cuaresma and Octavio Fern andez Amador: Business
cycle convergence in EMU: A second look at the second moment
2010-24 Lorenz Goette, David Human, Stephan Meier and Matthias Sutter:
Group membership, competition and altruistic versus antisocial punishment:
Evidence from randomly assigned army groups
2010-23 Martin G achter and Engelbert Theurl: Health status convergence at the
local level: Empirical evidence from Austria (revised Version March 2011)
2010-22 Jes us Crespo-Cuaresma and Octavio Fern andez Amador: Buiness
cycle convergence in the EMU: A rst look at the second moment
2010-21 Octavio Fern andez-Amador, Josef Baumgartner and Jes us Crespo-
Cuaresma: Milking the prices: The role of asymmetries in the price trans-
mission mechanism for milk products in Austria
2010-20 Fredrik Carlsson, Haoran He, Peter Martinsson, Ping Qin and Matt-
hias Sutter: Household decision making in rural China: Using experiments
to estimate the inuences of spouses
2010-19 Wolfgang Brunauer, Stefan Lang and Nikolaus Umlauf: Modeling hou-
se prices using multilevel structured additive regression
2010-18 Martin G achter and Engelbert Theurl: Socioeconomic environment and
mortality: A two-level decomposition by sex and cause of death2010-17 Boris Maciejovsky, Matthias Sutter, David V. Budescu and Patrick
Bernau: Teams make you smarter: Learning and knowledge transfer in auc-
tions and markets by teams and individuals
2010-16 Martin G achter, Peter Schwazer and Engelbert Theurl: Stronger sex
but earlier death: A multi-level socioeconomic analysis of gender dierences in
mortality in Austria
2010-15 Simon Czermak, Francesco Feri, Daniela R utzler and Matthias Sut-
ter: Strategic sophistication of adolescents - Evidence from experimental normal-
form games
2010-14 Matthias Sutter and Daniela R utzler: Gender dierences in competition
emerge early in live
2010-13 Matthias Sutter, Francesco Feri, Martin G. Kocher, Peter Martins-
son, Katarina Nordblom and Daniela R utzler: Social preferences in
childhood and adolescence - A large-scale experiment
2010-12 Loukas Balafoutas and Matthias Sutter: Gender, competition and the
eciency of policy interventions
2010-11 Alexander Strasak, Nikolaus Umlauf, Ruth Pfeifer and Stefan Lang:
Comparing penalized splines and fractional polynomials for exible modeling
of the eects of continuous predictor variables
2010-10 Wolfgang A. Brunauer, Sebastian Keiler and Stefan Lang: Trading
strategies and trading prots in experimental asset markets with cumulative
information
2010-09 Thomas St ockl and Michael Kirchler: Trading strategies and trading
prots in experimental asset markets with cumulative information
2010-08 Martin G. Kocher, Marc V. Lenz and Matthias Sutter: Psychological
pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural
experiment: Comment
2010-07 Michael Hanke and Michael Kirchler: Football Championships and Jer-
sey sponsors' stock prices: An empirical investigation
2010-06 Adrian Beck, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Jianying Qiu and Matthias Sut-
ter: Guilt from promise-breaking and trust in markets for expert services -
Theory and experiment
2010-05 Martin G achter, David A. Savage and Benno Torgler: Retaining the
thin blue line: What shapes workers' intentions not to quit the current work
environment2010-04 Martin G achter, David A. Savage and Benno Torgler: The relationship
between stress, strain and social capital
2010-03 Paul A. Raschky, Reimund Schwarze, Manijeh Schwindt and Fer-
dinand Zahn: Uncertainty of governmental relief and the crowding out of
insurance
2010-02 Matthias Sutter, Simon Czermak and Francesco Feri: Strategic sophi-
stication of individuals and teams in experimental normal-form games
2010-01 Stefan Lang and Nikolaus Umlauf: Applications of multilevel structured
additive regression models to insurance dataUniversity of Innsbruck
Working Papers in Economics and Statistics
2011-14
David J. Cooper, Matthias Sutter
Role selection and team performance
Abstract
Team success relies on assigning team members to the right tasks. We use controlled
experiments to study how roles are assigned within teams and how this aects team
performance. Subjects play the takeover game in pairs consisting of a buyer and
a seller. Understanding optimal play is very demanding for buyers and trivial for
sellers. Teams perform better when roles are assigned endogenously or teammates are
allowed to chat about their decisions, but the interaction eect between endogenous
role assignment and chat unexpectedly worsens team performance. We argue that
ego depletion provides a likely explanation for this surprising result.
ISSN 1993-4378 (Print)
ISSN 1993-6885 (Online)